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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD R. HOYT AND
MAUDE S. HOYT,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

WASATCH HOMES, INC.,

Case No. 7919
a

Utah Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Come now Richard R. Hoyt and Maude S. Hoyt the
respondents above named, and respectfully petition this
honorable Court for a rehearing in the said cause as to the
items hereinafter mentioned, and as a basis for such rehearing allege as follows:
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1. The Court erred in concluding that ((the parties
did come to agreement as to the terms and time of payment of the $19,000 balance and the security to be furnished by the purchasers (Johnsons) ".

2. The Court erred in concluding that ((The plaintiff Richard R. Hoyt himself admitted that the terms
contained in the Eggertson memorandum were acceptable
to him."
3. The Court erred in concluding that ((there existed
no point of difficulty of any importance between Hoyt
and the purchasers ( J ohnsons) ."

4. The Court erred in concluding ((There is no indication in the record that Hoyt ever voiced any dissatisfaction with the security arrangements except his own
failure to inspect the Montana property. Plainly this dereliction on his own part is of no avail to him in refusing
to go forward with the contract."
5. The Court erred in concluding that the Johnsons
had made arrangements for another improvement bond.
6. The Court erred in concluding that ((if it had been
Johnsons who had failed and refused to complete the transaction, Hoyt was authorized by the Agreement to retain
and forfeit the $1,000 as (liquidated and agreed damages.'"
7. The Court erred in concluding as follows: ((That
he (Hoyt) was aware that Johnsons had preserved their
rights under the contract, were willing and able to complete the transaction, and that he was therefore not in a
position to forfeit them out, is clearly manifest by the fact
that he paid them $1,000 for the contract of rescission."
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8. The Court erred in concluding that the Johnsons
had not failed in their obligations, and that they were
ready, willing and able buyers.
.
9. The Court erred in failing to do as it stated in its

opinion that it was obliged to do, namely: ((To take the
evidence and all fair inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs because they prevailed in the lower
courts."
10. The Court erred in reversing and remanding the
judgment of the trial court with directions to vacate judgment in favor of plaintiffs and enter judgment in favor of
defendant on its counter claim.

ROMNEY & NELSON
Attorneys for Respondents
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
We respectfully submit that this petition for rehearing was presented only after a careful examination of the
opinion of this honorable Court, which led to the sincere
conviction that the said opinion is based largely upon
erroneous conclusions drawn from the evidence in the
record. We shall attempt in this brief argument to show
the Court where the overwhelming weight of the evidence
does not sustain the conclusions arrived at by this honorable Court in its majority opinion. This brief necessarily
deals primarily with the facts rather than the law, for the
reason that the alleged errors, whch we shall attempt to
point out, are primarily errors of fact rather than law.
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We shall take up the points raised in our petition for
rehearing in the same order as they are set out hereinabove:
1. In the opinion of this Court the following statement appears: ((After further negotiations, the parties did
come to agreement as to the terms and time of payment of
the $19,000 balance and the security to be furnished by
the purchasers ( J ohnsons) ."

The only testimony on this point is that of Richard
R. Hoyt, Mark B. Eggertsen, Beatta Johnson and Elmer J.
Johnson.
Hoyt's testimony is that the -discussion in Eggertsen's
office ((was just a discussion and that after we had ironed
out some of our other problems and they were satisfactory
to both of us, then we would come back." (R. 19); also,
concerning the terms of the memorandum (Exhibit 1),
that neither of the parties agreed to the same (R. 22);
also, that when they left Eggertsen's office uwe told him
we had other matters to discuss before we could agree on
a contract." (R. 23).
Eggertsen testified, concerning Exhibit 1 : HI made a
memorandum of the items that it seemed they were trying to cover so that when all of the details were worked
out that we could prepare the Uniform Real Estate Contract covering the purchase and sale."; and, further:
((There is nothing definite about it. It was merely just preliminary to a final draft and so on, if all of the things they
were discussing were worked out, as I recall it." (R. 35) ·
He also testified as follows: nWell, the conversation was
terminated when they both-both parties seemed to agree
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that it was-there were too many indefinite points, that
we couldn't reduce it to contract at that time." (R. 36).
Eggertsen further confirmed the fact that Hoyt and Johnson, before they left his office, informed him in substance
that they wanted to discuss the matter further between
themselves and would agree not to proceed with the preparation of the uniform real estate contract until some more
definite terms were arrived at; and that he understood the
memorandum (Exhibit I) to be only a memorandum of
negotiations that were being conducted between them
looking to a possible final contract. (R. 38)
The testimony of Beatta Johnson is that the parties
were in entire agreement when Exhibit I was drawn
(R. 46). However, her testimony tails to disclose that the
parties ever agreed upon any of the terms of payment of
the $19,000. Her testimony further is that they were unable to get a bond, that the General Company turned
them down and that she does not know whether U. S. F.
& G. turned them down or not. (R. 53). She also testified that they were intending to put up a cash bond for
improvements but that they never advised Mr. Hoyt
thereof. (R. 57 & 58). Mrs. Johnson further testified that
she was employed as a real estate salesman by the appellant
Wasatch Homes, Inc. during all the time when these transactions were had. (R. 51)
Elmer J. Johnson merely ratified in substance the testimony of his wife. (R. 61)
We further point out that the agreement (Exhibit
C) between the Johnsons and the Hoyts recites in part as
follows: ccWhereas .... the said parties have been negoti-
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ating since the said time for the consummation of the
sale and purchase of the property, but have been unable
to agree upon the terms and conditions of the said proposed purchase and sale;"
The evidence hereinabove recited overwhelmingly
establishes that there was no meeting of minds or agreement whatever concerning the method or terms or time
of payment of the $19,000.00. It is undisputed that Hoyt
had never inspected or passed upon the security which the
Johnsons had in mind offering him. Surely it would be
most unjust to force the respondents to accept security,
whatever it may be, which they never agreed to accept
and which they never had an opportunity to inspect or
appraise.
2. This Court further stated: t(The plaintiff Richard

R. Hoyt himself admitted that the terms contained in the
Eggertson memorandum were acceptable to him."
It is true that counsel for the appellant attempted
strenuously in his cross examination of Hoyt to get him
to admit that the terms of Exhibit 1 were acceptable to
him. The following is taken from the said cross examination (R. 22 & 23):

HQ Was Mr. Johnson agreeable to the terms as set
down in the memorandum by Mr. Eggertson?
A Well, of course, neither one of us agreed to them
at that time.

Q I know, but were these terms acceptable to him?

I
J

A As far as I know, they were.
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Q And were they acceptable to you?
A Not until after we had solved our other problems
that confronted us.

Q Now, let we ask you, the terms that are set down
liere were acceptable to you as far as you were concerned
except you wanted to inspect the prope:I"ty in Bozeman?
A And I wanted him to obtain a bond for those improvements.

Q Well, now, let's take it a step at a time. First you
wanted to inspect this property in Bozeman which you
were to haveA As security.
Q-a deed for security on, and you wanted the bond
posted. Is that right?
A That's right.

Q Now, let me ask you, Mr. Hoyt, if it isn't a fact
that when you left Mr. Eggertsen's office you had instruced him to prepare a uniform real estate contract embodying the terms shown in exhibit 1.
A That's incorrect.

Q What had you· instructed him to do?
A To just wait until we had solved our other difficulties, and when we did that, we told him we would come
back. When we left his office, we told him we had other
matters to discuss before we could agree on a contract.
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We respectfully submit that this testimony does not
establish that the terms of the said Exhibit 1 were wholly
acceptable to Hoyt. This is particularly true in view of
the light of Hoyt's other testimony that there were other
things undetermined, such as the appraisement of the
Montana property (R. 18), the necessity of Johnson's
paying for the improvements on the 20 lots (R. 18), the
Johnsons' inability to furnish the bond (R. 19), and that
the said memorandum was merely an indication of a preliminary discussion. ( R. 19)
3. This Court further stated that ccthere existed no
point of difficulty of any importance between Hoyt and
the purchasers ( J ohnsons) ."

It is apparent from the overwhelming weight of the
evidence that there were at least 2 primary points which
remained undetermined, namely: First, the method and
terms of payment of the $19,000 and, second, the payment for the improvements on the lots, or the furnishing
of a bond for the same. It cannot be disputed that these
two points of difficulty between the parties did exist, and
that according to the evidence of the respondents and
their independent witness, Eggertsen, the said matters had
not been determined. The only remaining question, therefore, would be whether the said points are ccof any importance." It would seem to be apparent that the time and
method and terms of payment of the sum of $19,000 is
of exceeding importance to the respondents. It is a considerable sum, and represents by far the major portion of
the entire purchase price. By the same token the security~
which the appellant had in mind conveying to the respondents for the said payment was of equal importance.
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It goes without saying that in the' promotion of a
subdivision the payment for the improvements thereon are
rp.ost vital to the progress of the subdivision. This fact is
borne out by the testimony of Mark Eggertsen as follows:
((As I recall particularly there was the determination of
the two properties that were to be security and Mr. Johnson's procuring an improvement bond, and then I made
the comment to them that the plat should be completed
and :filed before any instrument was executed involving
the sale of lots. Our statute is quite clear, I pointed out,
that it is unlawful to sell a property before it is a legal
parcel of land."
4. In referring to the ((failure" of Hoyt to inspect
the Montana property, this Court stated: ccPlainly this
dereliction on his own part is of no avail to him in refusing
to go forward with the contract."
We are unable to :find in the record any testimony
to the effect that it was Hoyt's obligation to go to Montana and inspect the Montana property, or that he was
derelict in any sense in not inspecting the same. The undisputed testimony of Mr. Hoyt is that Johnson told him
he would take him up to Montana for the purpose of appraising the property. (R. 18) We fail to find any basis
in the record upon which Hoyt could be charged with
any dereliction in this matter.
S. The Court further stated that ccThe Johnsons both

testified that they had made arrangements for another
bond; this was not disputed;"
Beatta Johnson testified on cross examination that
they tried to get a bond and were turned down by the
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((General Company" but that she did not know whether
the U.S.F. & G. Company turned them down or not. (R.
53) She further testified on redirect examination that in
the forepart of January, 1952, they were going to put up
a cash bond for the improvements; that they had a man
that was going in with them and put up the cash but that
they never advised Mr. Hoyt of that. (R. 57 & 58) We
respectfully remind the Court that even if they did have
some intention of putting up a cash bond their failure to
advise the respondents of their arrangements constituted
a failure on their part to make complete arrangements for
the bond. Furthermore, the testimony of Beatta Johnson,
we submit, does not establish even that final arrangements
for such a cash bond had been made.
6. This Court in its opinion states: Hi£ it had been
Johnsons who had failed and refused to complete the transaction, Hoyt was authorized by the Agreement to retain
and forfeit the $1,000 as (liquidated and agreed damages.'"
This legal conclusion does not comport with the decision of this honorable Court in the case of Perkins vs.
Spencer, 243 Pac. 2d, 446. In that case the purchaser had
occupied the premises for a considerable time and the facts
generally seemed to be more favorable to a proper case of
liquidated damages than the instant case. In the case at
bar, according to the reasoning of this Court, Hoyt was
anxious to get the Johnsons out of the transaction and
presumably, therefore, would find it difficult to establish
any damages at all. In the Perkins v. Spencer case the ma-l
jority opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Crockett, recites
in part as follows:
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uwe hold that under the facts of this case,
the forfeiture provision amounted to a penalty
which is unenforceable. Defendants contend that
to so rule nullifies their contract and leaves them
with no other recourse than they would have had
if no such provision had been included. It is true
that this should be done only with great reluctance and when the facts clearly demonstrate
that it would be unconscionable to decree enforcement of the terms of the contract. This is
such a case.
(8) When the contract prov1s1on is unenforceable, the only way rights of the parties
can be adjusted is on the basis of damages ordinarily recoverable for such breach of contract.
See Malmberg v. Baugh, supra.
u

cc {9) The vendors are entitled to any loss
occasioned them by any of these factors:

( 1) Loss of an advantageous bargain.
( 2) Any damage to or depreciation of the
property;
( 3 ) Any decline in value due to change in
market value of the property not allowed for in items nos. 1 and 2; and
( 4) For the fair rental value of the property during the period of occupancy.

uThe total of such sums should be deducted
from the total amount paid in, plus any im-
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provements for which it would be fair to allow
recovery, and any remaining difference awarded
to the plaintiffs."
If this court could conclude in the Perkins v. Spencer case that the forfeiture provision amounted to a penalty it is difficult to see how, in the instant case, the appellant could retain and forfeit the $1,000 as ((liquidated
and agreed adamages."
7. We refer to this Court's statement as follows:
((That he (Hoyt) was aware that Johnsons had preserved
their rights under the contract, were willing and able to
complete the transaction, and that he was, therefore, not
in a position to forfeit them out, is clearly manifest by the
fact that he paid them $1,000 for the contract of rescission."
We respectfully refer to the agreement (Exhibit C)
which was made between the parties at the time the $1,000
was paid by Hoyt to Johnson. That agreement recites in
part: ccThe said parties have been negotiating since the
said time for the consummation of sale and purchase of
the property, but have been unable to agree upon the
terms and conditions of the said proposed purchase and
sale." It should be borne in mind that Hoyt was under
the necessity of proceeding with the promotion of his
subdivision; that Johnsons' failure to procure an improvement bond and to complete the purchase upon terms
agreeable to Hoyt was delaying the entire project; that
although Hoyt may have been able to terminate Johnsons'
rights without paying any consideration, by means of a
court action, such a proceeding would necessarily entall
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some delay and expense; that a reasonable solution to the
problem was to return to Johnsons the $1,000 which they
had paid and to restore the parties to their former status.
The fact that Hoyt did this should not in any sense be
taken as evidence that Johnsons had fulfilled their part
of the agreement. If it should be considered evidence that
Hoyt thought that Johnsons had fulfilled their agreement, such fact would be immaterial. It is most likely
that Hoyt was willing to return the $1,000 to Johnsons
because he had confidence in his right to recover the said
sum from the appellant herein. At any rate, Hoyt's willingness to restore the $1,000 to Johnsons should not be
considered evidence of anything other than his desire to
be fair with Johnsons. Certainly such attitude should not
be the basis of penalizing Mr. Hoyt.
8. We contend that the Court's conclusion that the
Johnsons had not failed in their obligations, and that they
were ready, willing and able buyers, is erroneous for the
reasons set forth hereinabove. We deem it unnecessary to
repeat the various arguments hereinabove stated.
9. We concur in the Court's statement that it is
obliged to take the evidence and all fair inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to plaintiffs because they
prevailed in the lower court. However, we respectfully
point out that after stating the said rule this Court has
utterly failed to follow it.

1

We have reviewed hereinabove the salient points of
the evidence in the record which sustain the findings of
the trial court that there was no meeting of the minds of
the parties with respect to the sale of the property. We
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submit that it cannot be denied that there was competent
evidence to sustain such a finding. Even if the evidence
is viewed in the light most favorable to the appellants it
cannot be said that there is any competent evidence to
sustain a conclusion that the respondent ever agreed to
accept property which he had never seen nor appraised
as security for the payment of $19,000. The most that
could possibly be said of the conversation in Eggertsen's
office and the memorandum (Exhibit 1) is that it was a
discussion of some of the terms of the payment of the
$19,000, which was not signed by the parties and which
could not possibly be considered as a binding agreement.
The Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement (Exhibit A),
at best is nothing more than an agreement to attempt to
agree in the future in respect to some of the most vital
parts of the proposed sale. We submit that if either party
attempted to enforce the terms of the agreement as set
forth in Exhibit A it would be impossible for any court to
determine the rights of the respective parties.
10. In citing the error of this Court in reversing and
remanding the judgment, we refer to the argument set
forth in each of the 9 points hereinabove, and, without
repeating them, make them a part of our argument in
support of this citation of error.

Respectfully submitted,
ROMNEY & NELSON
Attorneys for Respondents
212 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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